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ARGUMENT 
I: THE FACTS ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH PARTIES 
ESTABLISH THERE WERE NO SIMULTANEOUS CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS IN MEXICO WHEN MOTHER FILED HER 
PETITION IN UTAH. 
A. The Trial Court Failed to Identify the Factual and Legal Assumptions 
which Support its Dismissal of the Petition. 
The lower court failed to cite any basis upon which it discarded, almost in their 
entirety, the allegations contained in the petition establishing that the mother and the parties' 
children had resided in Utah since December 2010 (thereby establishing home-state status), 
that there were no simultaneous custody proceedings in Mexico and accordingly, jurisdiction 
was appropriately cast in Utah under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Utah Code § 78B- l 3- l O 1 et seq. (hereinafter UUCCJEA). (R. 
1-58-Petition filed 11/18/13; R. 377, 853--Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction dated 
12/5/14; R. 916, 931--Order Overruling Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation dated 3/17/15; R. 1238-- Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to 
Amend Order dated 4/30/15). 
Contrary to the unsupported contention of father in his brief, the lower court did not 
"take judicial notice, admit[] into the record or rely[] upon the findings, conclusions, and 
orders of various custody and other relevant proceedings in which the parties had previously 
engaged" (Appellee's Brief, p. 7, fn. 1). Aside from a singular statement that the "federal 
court's ruling [was] valid except to the extent that it implies this Court has jurisdiction to 
conduct child custody proceedings," the lower court made no findings as to the specific 
proceedings in Mexico it concluded were in existence at the time the petition was filed. Id. 
Instead of citing the specific orders in the Mexico courts on which it relied to 
conclude that there were simultaneous custody proceedings in Mexico, the lower court made 
non-specific and generalized statements regarding the subject. Commissioner Patton, in his 
recommendation, stated: 
R. 853, 855. 
The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 
when child custody proceedings were initiated in the 36th Court 
of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case 
number 1427/2007 and the subsequent bifurcation in the 24th 
Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in 
case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that jurisdiction and 
reserved the parties custodial rights as subject to further 
litigation therein in November 2010. 
Judge Johnson's March 17, 2015 Order upheld the recommendation of the 
Commissioner that Utah did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under the provisions of the 
UUCCJEA because there were 
R. 931. 
. . . both civil and criminal proceedings pending in Mexico 
wherein the parties' minor children and the parties' parental 
rights remain at issue. This indicates to the Court that Mexico 
has not abandoned or otherwise continues to exercise 
jurisdiction over issues of child custody .... 
The rulings and orders of the lower court did not refute mother's allegation that 
mother and the children had resided in Utah since December 2010 and that Utah was the 
home state of the minor children under the provisions of the UUCCJEA. Id. 
With the home state issue resolved, the jurisdictional issue comes down to whether 
there was undisputed evidence of the existence of simultaneous custody proceedings in 
2 
Mexico when the Utah petition was filed. Instead of there being undisputed evidence of 
simultaneous proceedings in Mexico, however, the undisputed evidence establishes the 
absence of custody proceedings in Mexico when the petition was filed in Utah. 
B. Father's Brief Establishes There Were no Simultaneous Custody 
Proceedings in Mexico. 
The parties agree there were two divorce-custody related proceedings filed in Mexico 
before the petition was filed in this case. The issue becomes one of assessing whether there 
are custody related orders emanating from those proceedings that are still in effect and 
whether the actions or proceedings in Mexico were still open, thus constituting a 
simultaneous proceeding. 
1. Main Mexico Divorce/Custody Action. 
The parties agree that Father filed for divorce against Mother in Mexico City in early 
October 2007. The action was filed in the Superior Court for the Federal District, Domestic 
Affairs, Thirty-Six Court,File No. 1472/2007. That case produced multiple orders relating 
to the custody of the children including the orders of 10/17/2007, 12/11/2007, 6/30/2010 
(Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts, ,r,r 4-6, 10-16, Addendum A at 4-6; 
Appellee's Brief, at 7-14). 
In the June 30, 2010 order, the court in Mexico entered a final custody order granting 
Mother sole custody or "custodia definitiva." Id. See also, Rec. 86, 88-89. In August 2010, 
both Mother and Father appealed the June 30, 2010 order entered in the divorce action. 
While the original divorce/custody case was on appeal, Father filed a no-fault divorce case. 
Because the original divorce/custody case had adjudicated or was in the process ofresolving 
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all the other issues attendant to a divorce, Father sought only a decree of divorce in the no-
fault proceedings. A decree of divorce was entered in that no-fault separate action on 
November 25, 2010. Rec. 1-7, Appellant's original brief, Addendum F; Appellees' brief at 
10. 
Both parties acknowledge that when the judge in the original divorce/custody action 
learned of the filing of the separate action for divorce under the newly adopted no-fault law, 
he entered the order of February 8, 2013. Appellant's Opening Brief, Addendum A, E; 
Appellee's Brief atp. 14. In that February 8, 2013 order, the court in the original divorce case 
rescinded and nullified all the previously entered custody orders in the case and dismissed 
the action with finality. Appellant's original brief at 8-9, 26-29, Addendum E; Appellee's 
Brief at 14. 
Accordingly, after February 8, 2013, there were no enforceable court orders regarding 
custody and visitation in Mexico and there was no underlying action relating to custody or 
visitation. Id. Father's brief acknowledges that the February 8, 2013 order not only 
terminated the main divorce case but acted to rescind all orders previously issued by that 
court. Appellee's Brief at 14. 
Accordingly, on November 18, 2013, when the petition was filed in this case, the 
main divorce action in Mexico had been dismissed and prior orders rescinded and vacated. 
Accordingly, there was no basis upon which the lower court in this case could have 
concluded that the main divorce action in Mexico constituted a simultaneous proceeding or 
that active enforceable orders from that action existed. 
4 
Although Father has implied throughout this litigation that the original 
divorce/custody action was a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA, his brief on 
appeal establishes clearly that he now concedes that the original divorce/custody action was 
dismissed and all orders therefrom recanted and nullified. Id. 
2. No Fault Proceeding in Mexico. 
As discussed above, while the original divorce/custody case in Mexico was on appeal, 
Father, trying to take advantage of newly enacted no-fault provisions in Mexico, filed a 
separate action for divorce in another court in Mexico and sought to obtain only a decree of 
divorce, reserving all other issues of property settlement, custody, visitation and support to 
be resolved by the court hearing the main divorce action. On November 25, 2010, the court 
signed a decree of divorce under the no-fault law and explicitly refused to deal with other 
issues in the divorce including custody of the children. Appellant's opening brief, Statement 
of Facts, ,r,r 4-6, 10-16; Addendum A at 4-6; Addendum F; Rec. 1-7. 
This separate action was filed by father only to get a no-fault divorce. No other issues 
relating to the divorce, including custody, were included because both parties knew that all 
such issues were presented in the original divorce/custody case. Father cites to and quotes 
from the decree entered in the action. Appellee's brief at 10. However, father's excerpts 
from the order are incomplete. In order to prevent any confusion, an English version of the 
order entered on November 25,2010 is attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A, R. 595-600. 
It should be noted that none of the orders from Mexico were admitted as evidence in 
the district court or otherwise authenticated under rules 901 and 902 of the Utah Rules of 
5 
Evidence. Further, the only motion requesting the court to take judicial notice was filed by 
Mother and related to the new action filed by father in Mexico 128 days after the petition was 
filed in this case (Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts No. 15; R. 895-897, 898-
913). 
A simple reading of the order in the no-fault case reveals that the court conducted a 
hearing at 11:30 a.m. on November 25, 2010. Id. The court proceeded to allow for the 
"authentication of the spouses" (R. 595). After the parties were authenticated, both mother 
and father "took the floor to declare irreconcilable differences .... "Id. The order then 
provides: 
Id. 
. . . given the legal situation of their minor children named 
S __ and R __ , both with the last name Matas Libbey, is 
under judgment in the Thirty-Six Family Court of this City, for 
which reason they request that the present petition for divorce be 
continued .... 
The only reasonable interpretation of the language in the order is that the court 
proceeded to allow the parties to put on evidence necessary to grant a divorce based upon 
irreconcilable differences, but deferred all other issues including those related to the minor 
children, to the court in the main divorce case described above. At the time the no-fault court 
entered its order, 11/25/2010, the main divorce case was active and proceeding. 
With that background, the portion of the order recited by the father makes perfect 
sense. Appellee's brief at 10: 
the matrimonial bonds between [father] and [mother] are hereby 
dissolved. . . With regard to the settlement proposal and 
6 
Id. 
counterproposal exhibited by the parties, their rights are 
safeguarded so that, if necessary, they may be upheld in the 
corresponding incidence. ( emphasis added). 
The case to which the no-fault court was referring could only be the main divorce case 
described above because there were no other actions pending. It was to that main action, that 
the court in the no-fault order earlier referred. There can be no serious dispute as to the 
interpretation of the no-fault order. The court identified the main divorce case in the early 
part of the order and further recognized that because the court handling that case had 
undertaken the resolution of the issues attendant to a divorce, including those relevant to the 
minor children, the no-fault court was not going to take evidence or attempt to resolve those 
custody issues in that action. The no-fault court, in the excerpt set out above, restates the 
holding that the rights of the parties are at issue in the "corresponding incidence" (main 
divorce action) and could be pursued in the no-fault action. 
There is nothing in the no-fault order that preserved jurisdiction in that case to hear 
custody or property issues at a later date. The court issuing the no-fault decree clearly 
identified the main divorce case as the case handling the other issues (including custody) and 
deferred their resolution to that court. 
Accordingly, the court in the no-fault case never undertook to adjudicate custody and 
visitation and did not preserve any right to do so. Rather the court simply deferred to the 
court adjudicating the main divorce case. Therefore, when the main divorce case was 
dismissed on February 8, 2013, there was no other action pending that could have inherited 
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the task of adjudicating the ancillary divorce issues. Thus, after February 8, 2013, there was 
no pending action in Mexico between these parties adjudicating custody and visitation. 
Certainly, at the time the petition was filed on November 18, 2013, neither action in Mexico 
was active or the source of any enforceable orders relating to custody of the minor children. 
3. New Action Filed by Father After the Utah Petition was Filed. 
If either of the two actions in Mexico were still on-going or available forums to 
litigate custody and visitation, Father certainly would have resorted to those forums to obtain 
relief on his custody-visitation requests after the February 8, 2013 order dismissing the main 
divorce case. Instead, after the February 8, 2013 order and after the filing of the petition in 
this case on November 18, 2013, Father filed a new action in Mexico on March 27, 2014 
(128 days after the filing of the Utah petition). Appellant's opening brief, Statement of Facts, 
,r 15. 
Father would not have filed a new action post-petition if he could have resurrected 
either the original divorce or the no-fault ancillary proceeding. Father, in his brief, fails to 
give any explanation for the incongruity of his argument. Appellee's brief at 20. 
Both Commissioner Patton and Judge Johnson, in their respective orders, referred to 
the two actions in Mexico as pending and on-going and actively asserting jurisdiction over 
the custody and visitation issue between the parties. The existence of the cases and alleged 
orders issued in those forums was the basis of the court's findings that Utah did not have 
jurisdiction. The fact that the main divorce case in Mexico had been dismissed and neither 
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case was active or on-going undercuts the factual and legal premise of the trial court's ruling, 
and the orders should be reversed and the matter remanded. 
II: THE PROVISIONS OF THE UUCCJEA ESTABLISH UTAH'S 
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE. 
The UUCCJEA gives priority to the child's home state in determining whether a state 
has subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. See Utah Code 
§ 78B-13-201(1). The state that "is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months 
before the commencement" has subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding. 
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(7), Utah Code§ 78B-13-201(1)(a). See also Meyeres v. Meyeres, 
2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604. 
Father does not refute the proposition that as long as Utah is the home state of the 
minor children at the time the petition is filed, no other state or country's court will have 
subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. 1 Appellee' s brief at 28-
31. The undisputed facts in this case establish that the mother and the children resided in 
the same location in Utah County, Utah from December 2010 to the present. Additionally, 
1See Utah Code§ 78B-13-201(1)(b)-(d); see also Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 
455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re Brown, 203 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App. 2006) 
("[H]ome-state jurisdiction trumps all other possible bases of jurisdiction in an initial child 
custody action .... "); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136, ,r 12, 302 Wis. 2d 
215, 733 N.W.2d 648 ("Under the Uniform Act, home state jurisdiction always receives 
priority, and other jurisdictional bases are available only when there is no home state, or 
where the home state declines jurisdiction."). 
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as argued in Point I above, there were no simultaneous custody proceeding in Mexico at the 
time the petition was filed in this case. Utah Code§ 78B-13-206. 
Father, unable to dispute Utah's home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, presents 
a flawed argument that is founded on an non-existent factual predicate. Father argues that 
mother has improperly relied upon the "initial child custody jurisdiction" provisions of the 
UCCJEA because Mexico already made "the relevant initial child custody determination" 
prior to the filing of the petition and Mexico retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over 
the matter. Appellee' s brief at 28-31. 
Father's argument does not identify the court in Mexico or the order issued therefrom 
that he maintains is the"initial child custody determination." Id. Because the court in Mexico 
that entered the no-fault divorce decree did not adjudicate any issues related to custody and 
visitation, the only possible action in Mexico that father could be referencing is the main 
divorce action. However, mother has demonstrated in Point I above that although that court 
entered numerous interim orders related to custody and jurisdiction, all those determinations 
and interim orders were vacated, nullified and rescinded by the order of February 8, 2013, 
which also dismissed the case. Appellant's original brief at 8-9, 26-29, Addendum E thereto. 
Father's argument is inconsistent with his own factual recitation. Father concedes that 
"on February 8, 2013, the 36th Family Court revoked the prior temporary custody orders .. 
. . " Appellee's brief at 14. The law is clear that an order that is rescinded, revoked or 
nullified has no ongoing legal effect. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ); Slay v. Nationstar Mortgage, 
L.L.C., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1365, 2010 WL 670095 (Tex. App. Fort Worth Feb. 25, 
10 
2010) ("[a] judgment that has been vacated has no legal effect" and "the matter stands 
precisely as if there had been no judgment."). Accordingly all orders entered in the main 
divorce action in Mexico were nullified on February 8, 2013 and had no ongoing legal effect. 
Additionally, although a rescinded or nullified order leaves the parties in the position 
they were in prior to the entry of the order, the underlying divorce action was also dismissed 
by the February 8, 2013 order. Therefore, there was no forum to exercise on-going 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(3) defines a "child custody determination" as a judgment, 
decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child. There is no question that the statute includes, within the 
term, "permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order[s]." Id. However, the facts of 
this case establish that there was no initial child custody determination in Mexico because 
all orders relating to custody were rescinded and nullified. 
Additionally, because there was no initial child custody determination in Mexico 
because all orders were vacated and the underlying action dismissed, Mexico could not retain 
continuing jurisdiction over that determination as provided in the UCCJEA. Utah Code § 
78B-13-202(1)(a)-(b), Appellee's brief at 28-30. 
III: INCHOATE PARENTAL RIGHTS DO NOT PROVIDE AN 
ALTERNATE BASIS UPON WHICH MEXICO CAN ASSERT 
JURISDICTION. 
Mother has established in Points I and II above that Utah has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the petition filed in this case based upon home-state status, the lack of any enforceable order 
11 
of custody from a court in Mexico, and the absence of any on-going proceedings in Mexico 
that could be characterized as a "simultaneous proceeding." Utah Code § 78B-13-206. 
Father contends in response that his inherent or natural parental rights, as recognized by the 
law in Mexico, constitute an initial custody determination, an on-going order of custody and 
a manifestation of Mexico's continuing exercise of jurisdiction in this case. Appellee's brief 
at31-38. 
Before treating the legal argument, it is important to examine the factual assertions 
upon which father bases his analysis. Repeatedly, father argues that the orders entered in the 
main divorce case in Mexico between 2007, when the case was filed, to February 8, 2013, 
constitute a "child custody determination" as defined by Utah Code § 78B-13-102(3). 
Further, father argues that because the courts in Mexico asserted jurisdiction in the main 
divorce action during the same period of time, Mexico has an on-going claim to exclusive 
jurisdiction in the matter. Id. Father relies on references to the preservation of general or 
inherent parental rights by the courts as some kind of custody determination and on-going 
order and proceeding. Id. at 33-35. 
The record is clear, however, that there was no court in Mexico that was asserting 
jurisdiction over the minor children of the parties when the petition in this case was filed. 
When the petition was filed in Utah, there was no open court case in Mexico to which an 
application could have been made by either party to assert jurisdiction over the custody of 
the children. Every order affecting the custody of the minor children originating in Mexico 
12 
was rescinded and vacated on February 8, 2013 and accordingly, there was no enforceable 
court order in place when mother filed her petition in the Utah courts. 
The remaining legal issue is whether inchoate or natural parental rights as recognized 
in Mexico constitute a child custody proceeding or child custody determination as defined 
by the UCCJEA. The resolution of the issue is resolved by the wording of the statute itself. 
If a party to a custody action contends that there is a competing jurisdiction who has a 
superior right to jurisdiction because of a simultaneous proceeding, the statute provides the 
means that should be employed to resolve the matter. 
Utah Code§ 78B-13-206(1) provides that "a court of this state may not exercise its 
jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a 
proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court 
of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the 
proceeding has been terminated .... " 
Mother has previously cited this Court to the holding inMeyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT 
App 364, 196 P.3d 604, in conjunction with the issue of whether the criminal action against 
mother could be considered a simultaneous custody action. Appellant's opening brief at 40-
41. The holding in Meyeres is likewise dispositive of the issue father now raises. 
In Meyeres, this Court stated that the courts of Utah are not bound by the 
determination of another jurisdiction as to whether Utah does or does not have jurisdiction. 
A Utah court faced with the question of whether a simultaneous action exists must make the 
decision for itself as to whether another state's court has jurisdiction. Id. ,-i 6, citing Utah 
13 
Code § 78B-13-206(2). Simply, a claim by a court of another state of jurisdiction is not 
binding on a Utah court. Id. 
This Court then cited cases where the challenging state did not have home state 
jurisdiction and therefore did not acquire jurisdiction in accordance with the UUCCJEA. Id. 
See Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz. 201, 42 P.3d 1166, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); 
Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d451, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006;In re Burk, 252 S.W.3d 736, 
741 (Tex. App. 2008); Hatch v. Hatch (In re Ka/bes), 2007 WI App 136, 733 N.W.2d 648 
("[T]he Idaho court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial determination of [ the child's] 
custody because [ the child's] 'home state' was Wisconsin. The Idaho court therefore did not 
have jurisdiction 'substantially in conformity with [the UCCJEA ], ' and the Wisconsin court 
was not prohibited from exercising jurisdiction under [the simultaneous proceeding statute]." 
(footnote omitted)). 
Importantly, the courtinNBv. GA, 133 Haw. 436,329 P.3d341 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014) 
noted that the comment to section 206 of the Uniform Act provides that "[ u ]nder this Act, 
the simultaneous proceedings problem will arise only when there is no home State, no State 
with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and more than one significant connection State." Id. 
at 442, 329 P.3d at 347. 
As applied to the facts of this case, a claim by a court in Mexico on November 18, 
2013, when the petition was filed, that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody of the 
parties' minor children, could not be made based upon home-state status, the existence of an 
actual pending court case in Mexico or the existence of an enforceable court order out of a 
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Mexico. Instead the claim of jurisdiction would have to be based upon some notion of 
natural or inchoate parental rights. Natural or inherent parental rights is not a basis of 
creating jurisdiction recognized under the UCCJEA. Utah Code§ 78B-13-206(1). 
Because inherent or natural parental rights are not a recognized basis for competing 
jurisdictional rights under the UCCJEA, father's argument that Mexico has jurisdiction based 
upon inchoate parental rights must be rejected. 
IV: THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS NOT A"SIMULTANEOUS 
PROCEEDING" REQUIRING UTAH COURTS TO DEFER 
JURISDICTION. 
The trial court held that because the termination of mother's parental rights could 
conceivably be part of the sanction imposed if she was convicted of wrongfully taking the 
parties' children out of Mexico, the criminal proceeding constituted a "child custody 
proceeding" under the UCCJEA. U.C.A. 78B-13-102(4). R. 377, 853--Order of Dismissal 
for Lack of Jurisdiction dated 12/5/14. 
Mother, in her opening brief, argued that contrary to the lower court's findings, the 
criminal case brought against her in Mexico is not a "simultaneous proceedings" under the 
UUCCJEA that can be used as a basis for Utah to defer jurisdiction. The basis of mother's 
argument is similar to that made in Point III above. Because the court in the criminal case 
did not acquire " ... [] jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the [jurisdictional 
requirements of the UUCCJEA]," it is not a simultaneous proceedings that requires Utah to 
defer jurisdiction. Utah Code § 78B-13-206 (2008); Appellant's opening brief at 37-41, 
Statement of Facts, ,r,r 32-33. 
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Father's responsive brief fails to engage Mother's argument and analysis. Father does 
not argue that the court in the criminal case acquired jurisdiction over mother based upon 
analysis of home-state status of the children. Of course the children have resided in Utah 
since December 2010, before the criminal case was commenced. Instead, father claims that 
because the alteration or tennination of mother's parental rights is a possible component of 
a sentence that may be imposed if mother is found to be criminally responsible for the crime 
charged, that possibility qualifies the entire criminal proceeding (guilt phase and punishment 
phase), regardless of what actually happens in the case, as a "child custody proceeding." 
Appellee's brief at 39-42. 
There are a myriad of reasons why the criminal case against mother cannot reasonably 
be construed as a competing child custody proceeding. First, the court in the criminal case 
only has jurisdiction over mother. The court does not have jurisdiction over father and 
importantly it has no jurisdiction over the children. Because the court hearing the criminal 
case does not have jurisdiction over both parents and the children, no comprehensive order 
adjudicating the custody of the parties and the children in one forum (which is the intent of 
the UCCJEA) can be put into place. All the criminal case can do is control the actions of 
·mother with the children during the time the mother is subject to its jurisdiction. 
Second, the fact that termination of parental rights is a potential sanction in a case 
does not make the entire case a "child custody proceeding." The Act states: 
( 4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which 
legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a 
child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, 
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, 
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termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic 
violence, in which the issue may appear. ... 
Utah Code§ 78B-13-102(4). 
The criminal case is not centered on mother's termination of parental rights as are the 
other types of proceedings detailed in the statute. The issues in the criminal case are 
exclusively centered on whether mother violated the specific elements of the law under 
which she was charged. That adjudication has nothing to do with the elements of a traditional 
action to terminate parental rights. Only if mother is convicted of the crime charged and not 
a lesser crime or degree thereof, does the issue of altering mother's parental rights even come 
into play. Therefore, the criminal action only becomes a "child custody determination" if 
mother is convicted of a crime that has, as a possible sentence, the alteration of her parental 
rights. Unless or until there is a conviction of the requisite crime that allows alteration of her 
parental rights, the proceeding is simply a criminal matter and not a child custody 
proceeding. 
Third, the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution reveal that mother is charged 
only with unlawfully taking the parties' children out of Mexico. As detailed in the record, 
the children are extraordinary individuals and have been nurtured and parented in an 
impressive fashion by mother and their grandmother. Instead of proof that is typically seen 
in a normal case that establishes conduct that harms the children, the evidence in this case, 
as detailed in Judge Kimball's ruling in the Hague Convention case, demonstrates an 
exceptional effort on mother's part to shoulder all the responsibilities with the raising of the 
children. Appellant's opening brief, Addendum Exhibit A. Father, on the other hand, even 
17 
after learning of their whereabouts has paid nothing for their support and maintenance either 
to the mother or the children themselves. Rec. 458-470, 481-90. Accordingly mother does 
not believe that any effort will be taken to alter her custodial rights or take the children out 
of her case. 
Fourth and most important, the criminal prosecution of Mother cannot be 
characterized as a "simultaneous proceeding" under the UUCCJEA (Utah Code § 
78B-13-206), because the criminal court did not acquire jurisdiction over all the parties and 
children and because the criminal court's acquisition of jurisdiction over mother was not 
based upon the home-state status of the children. Id. 
Again, the decision inMeyeres v. Meyeres, 2008 UT App 364, 196 P.3d 604, could 
not be clearer and the ruling more apposite to this case. Mother incorporates her analysis of 
the Meyeres decision and the underlying statute set out in Point III above. Based upon the 
law and facts laid out herein, the lower court's conclusion that the Mexico criminal case was 
a "simultaneous [custody] proceeding" should be reversed. 
V: THE COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT THE NECESSARY 
PROCEEDINGS TO EVALUATE WHETHER MOTHER HAD 
ENGAGED IN UNJUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT THUS 
ALLOWING UTAH TO DECLINE JURISDICTION. 
The court made a finding that Mother had engaged in unjustifiable conduct and that 
the misconduct justified Utah to decline jurisdiction. Appellant's opening brief, Findings of ~ 
Fact, ,r,r 32-33. The controlling statute is Utah Code§ 78B-13-208 (2008). In relevant part, 
the statute states: 
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Id. 
Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. (1) Except as 
otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204 or by other law of 
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this 
chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged 
in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction unless: (a) the parents and all persons acting as 
parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; (b) a 
court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 
78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203 determines that this state is a 
more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207; or (c) no 
other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78B-13-201 
through 78B-13-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction 
pursuant to Subsection (1 ), it may fashion an appropriate remedy 
to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the 
wrongful conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child 
custody proceeding is commenced in a courthavingjurisdiction 
under Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203. 
Mother alleged in her verified petition the facts and circumstances that prompted and 
justified her to move the children to Utah. Rec. 1, ,r,r 11, 12, 458-470, 481-90. Mother 
contended in her opening brief that the finding of the court that mother had engaged in 
unjustifiable conduct in moving the children was an abuse of discretion. Mother argued that 
the court reached the conclusion without the benefit of a hearing or offering mother an 
equivalent opportunity to present her evidence. Mother argued that the review and 
adjudication of disputed facts as part of a rule 12(b )( 1) motion to dismiss was improper and 
an abuse of discretion. Appellant's opening brief at 41-43. In response, father argues that 
the trial court did not actually weigh competing facts. Appellee' s brief at 45. Father contends 
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that the court reviewed a number of undisputed court orders from Mexico as well as the 
federal district court case. Id. 
The argument of father is without merit. The briefs filed with this court establish that 
the facts relating to mother's alleged misconduct are anything but "undisputed." Father and 
mother's rendition of the facts relating to their relationship (the existence of emotional and 
physical abuse), the conflicting findings of the two psychological reports conducted in 
Mexico, the basis of the earlier orders in Mexico allowing father only supervised visitation 
and other issues detailed in the parties respective statements of facts demonstrate that there 
is very little agreement on the facts that are relevant to a finding of misconduct. 
Accordingly, the conclusion that mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct must be 
reversed because there is an abundance of evidence that mother acted appropriately. The 
court's entry of an order dismissing the case on a rule 12(b )( 1) motion, where the material 
facts are disputed, constitutes error. 
Additionally, even if there was serious misconduct on the part of the Petitioner, the 
exceptions contained in the statute would apply. As set out above, serious misconduct could 
be a basis to decline jurisdiction "unless: ... ( c) no other state would have jurisdiction under 
Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203." Id. As argued above, there is no basis in the 
UCCJEA for a finding that Mexico has jurisdiction in this matter. There was no prior 
custody order that remained in effect that could be modified. There was no proceeding in 
place when the Petition was filed. Crucially, Mexico is no longer the home state of the 
children and has not held that designation since 2010, six years ago. 
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The trial court's finding that Mother engaged in unjustifiable conduct was improper 
on a motion to dismiss. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
VI: THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO UNDERTAKE THE 
STATUTORILY REQUIRED INVESTIGATION AS TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS. 
In her opening brief, mother argued that lower court failed to take the steps set out in 
the UCCJEA to investigate, on its own, the existence of"simultaneous proceedings" claimed 
to exist by father. Appellant's opening brief at 30. See Utah Code § 78B-13-206(1). 
Father argues first that mother did not raise the issue in the trial court. However, 
father then acknowledges that mother in fact, raised the issued in her rule 52 and 59 motion 
to amend judgment. Appellee's brief at 42; Appellant's opening brief at 1-2; R. 937,944. 
The inclusion of the argument in the rules 52 and 59 motion adequately raised the 
issue with the trial court. A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three 
requirements are met: (1) "the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;" (2) "the issue must 
be specifically raised;" and (3) a party must introduce "supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). The mother's rule 52 and 59 motion raised the 
issue explicitly and thereby satisfied the requirement of the case law. Appellant's opening 
brief at 1-2; R. 937, 944. 
On the merits, father's response establishes that, as mother contends, the trial court 
did not undertake any statutorily allowed measured to determine the existence of a 
simultaneous proceeding in Mexico and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of 
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discretion. State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, ,-i 9, 122 P.3d 571, 575; Snow, Christensen & 
Marteneau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, ,-i 17, 299 P.3d 1058, 1064 (citation, brackets, and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly if this Court does not hold that there are not, 
as mother contends, any simultaneous proceedings in Mexico at the time the petition was 
filed, the matter should be remanded with directions that the trial court communicate with 
the Mexico court in accordance with the statute. 
VII: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED DISPUTED 
FACTS IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Mother's opening brief demonstrated that the lower court did not reveal the decisional 
method it used in finding the facts upon which the order dismissing the petition was based. 
Appellant's opening brief at 32-3 7. Father does not contest the argument but instead asserts 
that there are no disputed material facts in this case. Appellee's brief at 45-46. 
Mother then contended that the actual findings, included in the lower court's orders, 
are legally insufficient in that they were not specifically detailed and did not include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Appellant's opening brief at 32-3 7. Father does not argue that the 
findings were legally sufficient and detailed to disclose the steps utilized by the court to reach 
its conclusions. Further father does not argue with the specific arguments made by mother 
that the individual findings are internally inconsistent, contrary to the evidence and lacking 
contrary to the applicable law. 
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Father also does not contest mother's argument the Utah appellate courts have been 
clear that in adjudicating a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the court is to accept the factual allegations in the petition as true and to make 
! 
all reasonable inferences therefrom. Oakwood Vil/. LLC v. Albertson, Inc., 2004UT101, ,r,r 
8-9, 104 P.3d 1226. Appellee's brief at 42-43. Further father does not contest that all of the 
facts required to establishjurisdiction in Utah were included in the petition. Rec. 1, 8; 11, 17 
and 53. Accordingly, mother respectfully asserts that the court should have denied the 
motion to dismiss based upon the presumptions afforded the verified petition and the: failure 
to do so constitutes reversible error. 
I 
Father has limited his argument on the issue to an analysis of Rule 12(b)(l) 
adjudications on motions to dismiss. Father contends that the court may grant a mqtion to 
dismiss even when the material facts upon which the motion is based are di~puted. 
Appellee's brief at 42-43. 
In determining the method a court should employ in resolving factual disputes 
attendant to the adjudication of a motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction, mother 
contends that the process set out for rule l 2(b )( 6) motions should be reviewed. This portion 
of rule l 2(b) provides that if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56 .... " 
There is no question that rule 12(b )(1 ), which is the basis of father's motiori in this 
case, does not provide a similar provision for the conversion to summary judgmertt when 
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outside material are relied upon by the court in its decision. This court has consistently 
prohibited the weighing of evidence in adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b )( 1 ). 
To allow a court to enter findings on disputed material facts in the course of ruling on a 
motion to dismiss would deny to the parties " ... an adequate opportunity to rebut materials 
outside the pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 Ut 82, 987 P.2d 36; see also Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Cred Ass'n, 587 P.2d 151 (Utah 1978). The offering of 
affirmative evidence does not automatically convert a rule 12(b )(1) motion in to one for 
summary judgment, and "uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(l) . 
. . . " Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242, 285 P.3d 1230; rev. on other 
grounds, Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27, 332 P.3d 922. 
Father takes issue with mother's summary of the holding in Spoons. Appellee's brief 
at 42-43. Mother contends that she has accurately characterized the relevant findings of the 
court in that decision. The point is that the Utah appellate courts have placed a general 
prohibition against a court weighing evidence when considering motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment. The law is clear that the trial court cannot weigh contradictory evidence 
or determine credibility when deciding whether dismissal or summary judgment is 
appropriate. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73, ,r 18, 196 P.3d 588. 
It would be the a clear violation of that prohibition and a violation of basic due process for 
the court to sanction the lower court's weighing of conflicting evidence in the course of an 
adjudication of a motion to dismiss. 
24 
Mother submits that all the findings and conclusions of the court relating to 
jurisdiction must be rejected and reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court dismissing this case based upon a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with the UUCCJEA. 
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Addendum 
Exhibit A 
No Fault Divorce Decree 11/25/2010 
Rec 595-600 (redacted) 
":ZOJD;,BI<:;EfjTENNIAL OF)iExi(W-1. 
JNDEPENliENt!EAND t&VTENNIAL OF THE MEXiciN)/EVOLifrioii/11 - - -- -
In Mexi~o City; Fe<iel<l! 1)$,tr,ict, !,it eleven 1lili1y on ilie twe.nty fifth day of 
Nove~~r ofthe<1ce,ai-=~9thousari_d -Ii!@, ~n/ilie indicat,ed-'date:cmd time verified 
by the.hearlng:referred ~: in;t\rtj¢Je.A7tJ3 ·of.ilie:;C!iv.i):~()AA«i,utes-¢ode.:present 
in this CC>W#oom before AttY. RODRIGO ALBERTO:HA'CESfRODIUGUEZ, 
Tw~nty-F9urtli A,cting:,Jucige of the l'alajly Court; #s~~~:by;tlle Arbi~or of 
theMinistry <>f'Law; !Atty. XOGHJTI:. AY£NA RTJiZ, -wJi~--;igp~ ~-awito~s in 
the tecorck ofiPIVO!tCE filed by MATAS VIDAL, .• JUAN PABLO against 
LIBBEY .AQQILE~ S,USAN C91'lSq.ELO; ~ µurij~~r 1529/2010, 
appearin~BOTH:PARTIES,:identi:fied respectively whhNotei: i:e~on_:gu-d 
nUIJJ];m,, 7_8493_57 ancl 9§43l60,: issµed: by the Fedetjil ~lectoial·Jnstitute, 
identity d®wiients:that:are 'affinned to have been presentecfancl.,refunied to the 
,· . . . . . ' ,. ., . ' . . . . . .,- , . .• ·"". ~· ' . . ' ,. ~. . 
interested parties, THE.JUDGE OFFICIALLY DEC~p::THE IiBARING 
OPEN: Toe,amJter¢c_a~ion of the spQuies'.proceeded irom~fe.ly .the~, in 
which :the petitioner was Ie~y authenticatedd®11gli his ;:fuitfai ';r~iv9rceJiling 
and as ~~in the civil registry he ,pteseiiied, and .thef s~oiise. being:divorced, 
tlti()llfW -the sqt,poella. mag~ · by the Disttj~t S~~e~ oi(th~ twe,ntieth day of 
-Septlmlbers,fJJie·currenf,'year, as well as:with 1he. responseJo it0issued llpOn .the 
petition lllc!ije: b.efQre t\µs_ Colll:t on th~ l:\:V,eli\h_ of Qsf9pc#; ~. the 
he~s ptoceeded- to: the coniiliatoty 'I'~ in ~~Qn. to th~ ~t 
cons - nces ,of dissolution .of,1he matrtmomal b6fufs · both. - -·es 1akin -_ the 
- - eqqe_, - -·-- _, - --- ----, - ' __ , -' ' . - -- •· ·-- t - - - pam g 
_floor tQde<llat¢:~:n~~ai>i~ diffe~~~; .gjyeiith~(#\efJ,~gat ~itµatioll.oftheir 
minor childre~ -nai:ned ~ltJIIIJ and ~I b<J:fu:with 1he last name 
MAT.As f;iBBE:'Y; .l.S imderjudgmenflll the ljurty,:Sixth'.Family Court of this. 
' . - . ~ " ~ . . ·. - - .. •.- ' 
Cey, for whihJ.i reasonJhey ~~ tllanhe p.r:esent,petition for divorce be 
conti:ri*e<L THE JUDGE ,AGREES: The;foregoinf;Jn~arin~ is, held and :up<m 
reviewing We $t¢i of1be. present records in a(leord;m~ with the _provjsions or 
Article 287 of the Civil Cod~the correspon<Jing resolutfon;ispronounced : 
MEXICO, FEDER.AL DISTlUCT ON THE T\VENTY,.FlFTH OF 
NOVEMJ)BR, OF THE YEAR TWO THOUSAND AND TEN - HA YING 
REVIEWED the records and taking into considerafio11 that this Court is 
compe~nt to hear and rule· on the presentpetition for Divorce filed by MAT AS 
VIDAL, JUAN PABLO against LIBBEY AGUILERA, SUSAN. CONSUELO, 
under ~e number 1629/2010, in accordance with the.provisfons-of ,Articles 156 
paragraph XII and 159 of the Civil Procedures Code for- the Federal District, in 
concordance with SectiQns I, Il, 48 paragraph ill and 52 paragraph, II of the 
Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Federal District, added to 
000595 
"20~0,]!If:EliTEIVNµL QF¥EXJCA!f _ 
INDEPENDENCE ANiiCENTENNTAL'OFTHE 
·}.fE]j]<iANitEl,'QLUTIQN!' 
~~--~ct'.tllat thete~t~~~~ of:tli~Jrialtiiporiy and ~e ~utl)eiltiAAti611 ot~,f p~,e,s 
h~ _be~n iiuiy aqcre(ljiEl<,F~y )he certified copy c,f therr mariiage ,i:ertili~teta 
public: doctinient whose evidentiaty v.tlµ~ is fully feC()gnize~ iii .accordan~ 
' . ,, . . . . . - .. __ . -- . ,-. -, / .. -,·.·· ,,,, ,;_' 
~th tl,ieJ){Q~ioDS'of ArtjQle~J,9 ancfso of the Civil Code 'in relatiOJl'tp Articles 
327J)~~~lHV anq_@Softlie aijovem~tioned ,Cbae Qfle~:t~gulations~,atid 
,~a~g; tipcfa~ the legaj supposition e~btiS]ied in Section 2{itt:p(.tjie· Civil 
~efor.tbe:feder:al :Oistria. which which verbatim readst 
'iJJfy.ort:e d,fs_s_olv_,;s th~ :matrimopial bon~ and leaves -the_ 
$JJ~e$ ftee Jo enter into o:noiher mwriage. It may lie 
r~eg by._one: _or poth spquses when either of th.'emfile.r;Jt 
bef <Jre ihe;iegai. authority, declaring his or her will ofnot 
:., ~ ~ 
;,ti§#!!'t ,to· cpiififtf!e, tM inriti-JmQny, _wiihtrut Qfl)1 r.fJ9!!iJ:f!me,u 
Aq '!,uii9qte the CtlZl§e]or- whiq, ids requested. whimever at 
. ieasta yetu Jiaspmsedstnce. (!htering info the marriage/' 
;fh'~•mamtnQniJi{ ~n~:Qetween Mr, ~ TA$· Vll)J\l,; ,JµAl\T I>ABLO anq-~, 
·:t,IBBEY\AGUILERA;'~U:SAN.GONSUELO .are hereby ~lv~_,which-were 
-e~~~j~to/iti ¥~q ¢ity ·of-the Fe~e.l'a\ Disl:rict· 1lrider:the SEJ>~m 
· PROPBltTY: SYSTEM on the,:twenty;.sixth day of June. of.:iimeteeil iilitety;.nfue 
l!#~i=fW¢f'.o,µg~~)i~lµ,strY· ipfom,,a~o~~ EITTITY•Ci9~.QFFI~~-OJ;:qQ~l11 
)>Q~t)~J~~,4~~; --XEAR 1999? er.Ass ~JIUM9¥¥,. i}914. 
.:~~$'r~co,ver ifiek'ft!Ji ~q~ 10 enter illtQ. new·marri~es._Wlth'n~resmctfons 
W~Q~V:er~: In ~s do_~ent, botli parties express their compl~te -~~erit 
wjQ.l' the rullng-~lidejir _t!lis -matt.er~·for which, in this document, t11ey dei:1~ 
that itis_ executal>Je'.fo'r]ill le~alpurposes that. may arise. Consequently, let'· the 
J~fr<:(#qr oftlle Civil R~stry Qftlrls Ci1)' be noti6ed in order to nialce. the 
ann9:t3tlc,ns re©Ted.to·iliArticle-~91 of the civil Colle. W'rtb ~gard ~•:the 
.settlement proposal and ciiunteiproposalexhibited-by the. parties, their rights are 
. . . . . -
safeguarded sd :'that, if necessary, th~y may be upheld in the corresponding 
4tckl~~-Let a-set of certified ·copies 9fth~ present proceeding be forwarded to 
e~h :of'tlie parties upon receipt of the corresponding payment and proof. With 
· that, the p~ent ~tt~ is toµclude<i at twelve fifteen on the day, month ,m.d year 
in w}licll ifis ,na¢ted, sigrlmg th;ose who appeared together with the undersigned 
.· Jlid~e and Arbitration Secretary; 
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[Four signatures} 
Lln th~ margiriisth~ sealQftheTwenty-Fourth Family court] 
IN LEGAL BULLETIN No. 211' 
;C6gimSPQ~WG TO THE 29TH DAY 
OF NOV'. OR :2010, WHICH UPON 1TS 
_i>trnU¢;\TiON 
R.ECOROED. 
IS LEGALLY 
·nm3ota OF NOV.OF2010 AT TWELVE 
pty;qif!tEl~ ITS EFFECTS THE 
·NQTIFlCATIONOF.[ILLEGIBLEJ. 
000597 
-l 
;) 
_, 
869000 
:__xj __ §
-_sn· 1~ .ciudad c1e ~c9, llistrit<> -~ej:!~_ •• __ 
lioras .taon treinta ~t()S _del veintioinco ae 
--:novi~re del afto dos mil. die:-., -clla, y ra-seftal.adcls p;u:'1:1 · 
-que te~ verif:icativo ia.- audiencia - .• qlle, s¢ -~fiere ~i 
~t~c;, 2~12 s del- c&ligo: _~ae.: Px.)J;:E!Clbl4m~_-- -~vft~~~-:- --· 
_ 1>~eserities en el lccal de e~te Jµzg· 
RODR:[00 ALBEJm) aAc:B8 ~fqt7~z'; 
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-~~~ $ escrito µd,c~ •~ ~iici~, d~. p~~r-¢!.q; y • 
, -- :~~fJt:ado.~ -~ registro ci.v.p:· _ 
,-,;._•-~:::! ... ~"ft;~!'\,~--- - C /' d:lve>r~~te a txav6s -~ empl' 
. 
. 
i 
t 
-_ (!;. Notificadora de J.a $iscrlp i6ii el- cila, veiJite de\ 
eptiembre del. aiio en curscr, asi· bomo ~- ~u c~test~:ti~ • 
..._..._ ___ ~--- .. ; :•- - .. , _._ . .. . . . -:~-·-_· ···_ ... . . .. . .. , ,. .. -
,' ~~,ida a ~ solioitucl _pre13E!Ji,tads. ante· este-. J112~p .# 
docie: de octubre de los ~al,es. J\ cont:innaai6n _ se; 
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:rnscdti4~:: ~~ ~9, »BL~~ oi, •~· 17, Acr.i\. 
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